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Abstract— Nowadays, biometric-based authentication method 
has been gradually replacing the traditional authentication 
username/password. Using biometric data for authentication is 
very convenience, however some issues related to security and pri-
vacy of this kind of system need to be taken into consideration 
carefully. In this paper, we have proposed a multi factor bio-
metric-based remote authentication protocol. This protocol not 
only is resistant against the attacks over the insecure network, but 
also protects user’s sensitive data such as biometric template 
stored in the database, thanks to the combination of Chebyshev 
polynomials and fuzzy extractor. Our proposal overcomes the vul-
nerabilities of some previous works. At the same time, the protocol 
also obtains a low false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate 
(FRR) of 3.07% and 7.69%, respectively. 
Keywords— remote authentication, biometric template protec-
tion, Chebyshev polynominal, fuzzy extractor. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 21st century, we have been witnessing the tremendous 
growth of information technology in both quantity and quality. 
Research results from the modern technology are increasingly 
applied in people.’s daily life. Among them, Internet is one of 
the greatest accomplishments that connects people all over the 
world. It has been widely used in every aspect of life. The 
widespread use of the Internet has been the foundation of the 
global trade and also the applications. of electronic commerce. 
The authentication of each individual over the network imposes 
many risks. Therefore, the demand for a secure information 
system, which ensures the confidentiality of the communication 
between client and server becomes more and more important. 
The first step to build a secure information system is authentica-
tion.  
Traditional authentication method that most e-commerce 
providers are using is username/password. To login system, us-
ers have to provide their username and corresponding password. 
However, the password itself has some natural setbacks. Firstly, 
it cannot identify legal user with an imposter who is able to 
access to user’s password. Besides, the more complicated – 
more secured a password is, the harder it is for users to 
remember. That is to say, a “true” password is difficult for 
people to remember but easy for computer to figure out. 
Especially, with recent technology development, computer 
ability is being enhanced; meaning password cracking chance is 
rising too. For that reason, biometric based authentication 
method was born. The first advantage to be mentioned is that 
biometric (such as face, voice, iris, fingerprint, palm-print, gait, 
signature,…) reflects a specific individual which helps 
preventing multi-user usage from one account [1]. Moreover, 
using biometric method is more convenient for users since they 
do not have to remember or carry it with them. 
However, biometrics still has some troubles with the security 
of the authentication system. As we all know, human has a 
limited number of biometric traits; therefore, we cannot change 
our biometrics frequently like password once we suspect that the 
templates are revealed [2]. Moreover, the fact that people 
register many online services makes them use the same 
biometrics to sign in some services. That leads to the cross-
matching attacks when attackers follow user’s biometric 
template cross the online services in order to track their 
activities. Another concern relates to the natural set-backs of 
biometrics. The fact that biometrics reflects a specific individual 
means it contains sensitive information which users do not want 
attacker or even the server storing users’ authentication data to 
discover. Last but not least, the network security needs to be 
discussed when user’s private information is transmitted over 
insecure network [3]. 
The goal of this work is to propose the biometric-based re-
mote authentication protocol relied on Chebyshev polynomials 
and Fuzzy Extractor. This protocol not only protects sensitive 
data of users from attackers inside and outside system but also 
gain the facial recognition rate high. That makes the proposal 
highly practical. 
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows. 
In the section 2, related works is briefly reviewed. We show 
what previous works have done and their limitations. From that 
point, we present our motivation to fill the gap. In section 3, we 
introduce the preliminaries used in the proposal. In the next 
section, our proposed protocol is described in detail. In the 
section 5, the evaluation is presented to demonstrate for our 
proposal. Finally, the conclusion is included in the section 6. 
II. RELATED WORKS 
Through years, the development of biometric based authen-
tication protocol has been grown. In this section, we take a look 
back on some important milestones from the traditional 
username/password to the state-of-the-art of the remote authen-
tication methods. 
The pioneer in the field of remote authentication based pass-
word is Lamport in 1981 [4]. However, in the following works, 
other researchers found out the weakness of his model which 
made the authentication system very insecure. In Lamport’s 
model, the users’ passwords were stored directly in the server’s 
database; therefore it was very convenience for the administrator 
to know or even to steal users’ passwords. 
In 2000, Min-Shiang Hwang and Li-Hua Li proposed a new 
remote user authentication scheme using smart cards [5]. The 
approach based smart cards has had its own advantages and dis-
advatages: 
 The smart cards allowed business transactions to per-
form securely and efficiently with less interference from 
human. Smart cards also could be used for identifica-
tion. They could provide complete identification in cer-
tain industries: car’s license, patient card in eHealth, cit-
izen card in eGovernment, student card, or bank card, 
… They were as easy to use as a credit card, but more 
secure. They were also lightweight, so easy to carry. 
 The first disadvantage of smart cards was easily lost be-
cause of its small size. The smart cards could have mul-
tiple uses, therefore, the lost cards could caused a lot of 
troubles to their users. The second disadvantage was 
their level of security. They were not as secure as some 
people believed. This created a false sense of security, 
then people could not have enough care about protecting 
their card and its detail. In addition, there existed some 
possible risks of identify theft. 
In 2007, Julien Bringer et al [6] introduced new approach to 
guarantee the security in biometric-based authentication proto-
col. The proposal relied on Goldwasser-Micali encryption 
scheme to conceal the users’ biometric features; however there 
still existed some vulnerabilities which made system not resist 
the attacks from inside. Moreover, using Goldwasser-Micali 
was extremely time consuming, especially when the number of 
users increased.  
In 2009, Chun-I Fan and Yi-Hui Lin [7] tried to improve the 
security level of biometric based remote authentication system 
by using multi factors authentication. The security was indeed 
increased, however users felt inconvenient when they were re-
quested to provide many factors to use service. Moreover, at-
tackers totally could impersonate users to login and to use the 
service on behalf of users in case they stolen all the registered 
factors. 
In 2010, Maneesh Upmanyu, Anoop M. Namboodiri, 
Kannan Srinathan, and C. V. Jawahar introduced a new concept 
– blind authentication [3] for remote authentication protocol. 
This protocol was called blind for a reason that it revealed noth-
ing but user’s identity to server. The security seemed to be flaw-
less except there was necessary to exist a Trust Third Party who 
took the responsibility to register and classify users. However, 
there was nothing to ensure that this Trust Third Party was re-
sistant against some attacks. 
In 2010, Li and Hwang [8] proposed another biometric-
based remote authentication scheme using smart cards. After 
that in 2011, Das  [9] pointed out that scheme had some flaws. 
And then, he proposed an enhancement of biometric based au-
thentication protocol using smart cards in order to remedy the 
flaws of the previous scheme. Unfortunaly, in 2012,  Cheng-Chi 
Lee and Chi-Wei Hsu found out that Das’s scheme was vulner-
able to privileged insider attacks, off-line password guessing at-
tacks and also could not provide user anonymity. To solve these 
problems, Lee and Hsu presented a secure biometric-based re-
mote user authentication with key agreement scheme using ex-
tended chaotic maps of the Chebyshev polynomials. 
In 2015, Zhang Min et al pointed out some design flaws in 
Lee-Hsu’s protocol and proposed an enhanced scheme based on 
fuzzy extractors in [10]. Nonetheless, these protocols did not 
mention the resistance to the inside attacks.  
In this work, we propose a secure biometric-based remote 
authentication protocol using Chebyshev polynomials and 
Fuzzy Extractor. The fuzzy extractor scheme is applied to pro-
tect the original biometric template. The Chebyshev polynomi-
als are used as a trapdoor which conceals a secret factor of user, 
however, server can be sure that this factor belongs to the user 
without discovering the value of this factor, and vice versa. In 
this scheme, we do not employ smart cards however, the security 
is still guaranteed in high level. 
III. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Chebyshev Polynominals 
The Chebyshev polynominals and their properties, which are 
applied in the proposed protocol, are briefly described in this 
section. We call 𝑇𝑛(𝑥) as a Chebyshev polynomial in 𝑥 of de-
gree 𝑛, in which 𝑛 is an interger. If 𝑥 is a variable taking value 
over the interval [−1, 1], 𝑇𝑛(𝑥) will take the value over the in-
terval [−1, 1]. The trigonometric definition of the Chebyshev 
polynomials can be presented as following: 
𝑇𝑛(𝑥) = cos(𝑛 ∙ 𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑥)) 
     Or            𝑇𝑛(𝑥) = cos(𝑛 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠
−1(𝑥)) 
The Chebyshev polynomials can also be defined by the re-
currence relation 
𝑇𝑛(𝑥) = 2𝑥𝑇𝑛−1(𝑥) − 𝑇𝑛−2(𝑥),    𝑛 ≥ 2 
𝑇0(𝑥) = 1 
𝑇1(𝑥) = 𝑥 
 The Chebyshev polynomials have two important properties 
[11]  
  Semi group property: 
𝑇𝑟(𝑇𝑠(𝑥)) = cos (𝑟 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠
−1(cos(𝑠 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(𝑥)))) 
= cos(𝑟𝑠 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(𝑥)) = 𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥) 
= cos (𝑠 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(cos(𝑟 ∙ 𝑐𝑜𝑠−1(𝑥)))) = 𝑇𝑠(𝑇𝑟(𝑥)) 
 where 𝑟 and 𝑥 are positive numbers and 𝑥 ∈ [−1, 1] 
 This semigroup property was also defined on interval 
(−∞, +∞) by Zhang [12] in 2008. Therefore, the prop-
erty can be represented as follows:  
𝑇𝑛(𝑥) ≡ (2𝑥𝑇𝑛−1(𝑥) − 𝑇𝑛−2(𝑥)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝,    𝑛 ≥ 2 
Where 𝑝 is a large prime. Evidently, 
𝑇𝑟(𝑇𝑠(𝑥)) ≡ 𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥) ≡ 𝑇𝑠(𝑇𝑟(𝑥)) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝 
This is effective property, very useful in authentication 
protocol, then we apply it in our proposal as public key 
cryptosystem.  
 The chaotic property: 
When the degree 𝑛 > 1 , the Chebyshev polynomial 
𝑇𝑛(𝑥): [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] is a chaotic map with its invar-
iant density 𝑓∗(𝑥) = 1
𝜋√1 − 𝑥2
⁄ , for positive Lya-
punov exponent  𝜆 = ln (𝑛)  
The security level of the Chebyshev polynomials depend on two 
typical problems, which are assumed to be difficult to solve in 
polynomial time: 
(1) The Discrete logarithm problem (DLP): Given two ele-
ments 𝑎 and 𝑏 , there is a computational problem of finding 
𝑥 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑏 such that 𝑏 = 𝑎
𝑥. In Chebyshev speaking, it is 
hard to find the integer 𝑥, such that 𝑇𝑥(𝑎) = 𝑏. 
(2) The Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP): Given an element 𝑥, 
and the value of 𝑔𝑥 and 𝑔𝑦, how to compute the value of 
𝑔𝑥𝑦 , in which 𝑥, 𝑦 are two randomly chosen integer, and 𝑔 
is a generator of some group (it can be a function). There-
fore, in Chebyshev speaking, though we know three ele-
ment 𝑥, 𝑇𝑟(𝑥) and 𝑇𝑠(𝑥), it is difficult to calculate the value 
of 𝑇𝑟𝑠(𝑥)   
B. Secure Sketch and Fuzzy Extractor 
Secure sketch is a technique which allows a noisy input to 
be reconstructed. It has two components, SS – Sketch and Rec – 
Recover. SS component takes an input w, then returns a sketch 
s. To Rec component, if its input w’ is close to w and there is the 
helper data s, it can return exactly w. The key point of the secure 
sketch is the public sketch s does not disclose the biometric 
information w. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The secure sketch scheme. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The fuzzy extractor scheme 
As shown in Fig. 2, fuzzy extractor is a technique which can 
extract nearly uniform randomness R from its input. This 
extraction is error-tolerant since R is unchanged even if the input 
is not the same, as long as the gap between it and the previous 
one is acceptable. Consequently, R is used as a key to encrypt/ 
decrypt or to authenticate. In other words, fuzzy extractor is 
counted as biometric tool to authenticate a user using his or her 
own biometric template as a key. 
To preserve high security, the authors in [13] applied secure 
sketch to construct fuzzy extractor. The scheme is demonstrated 
as Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 3. Construction of Fuzzy Extractors from Secure Sketches [13] 
IV. PROPOSAL PROTOCOL 
TABLE I.  NOTATIONS USED IN PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
Notation Descripstion 
K Key generated from Fuzzy Extractor process 
HD Helper Data generated from Secure Sketch scheme 
PWT User’s password created in the enrollment phase 
BT The original biometric template 
BBT The secure version of biometric template 
PW The password provided in authentication phase 
B The biometric data provide in authentication phase 
K The biometric key generated in authentication phase 
p A large prime number 
ID User identity 
RC, RS The random integers generated from Client and Server 
h(.) A secure one way hash function 
A B The exclusive-or (XOR) operation between A and B 
A || B The concatenation operation between A and B 
t The time-stamp 
A. Enrollment Phase 
In the enrollment phase of this client/server architecture, a 
client side definitely makes a first move. At first, a user chooses 
his/her password PWT, then provides his/her biometric feature 
BT  (for example: user’s face) for a sensor. The Fuzzy Extractor 
module installed in the user’s device takes PWT  and BT as inputs 
to generate a biometric key KT  in the first step. Next step, user 
calculates the secure biometric version 𝐵𝐵𝑇 = 𝐵𝑇  ⨁ 𝐾𝑇  and 
ℎ( 𝐾𝑇 ∥ 𝑃𝑊𝑇). Then, he/she sends those two elements to server 
side in the third step. Note that all messages between the client 
and the server over transmission network are protected by asym-
metric cryptosystem (PKI – Public Key Infrastructure) 
Once receiving the package from user, server selects ran-
domly two number s, XS (XS is kept in secret), then calculates 
𝑆𝑃𝑈𝐵 ≡ 𝑇𝑋𝑠(𝑠) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝. SPUB is considered as a public key of 
registration server.  In the next step, server creates user’s identity 
ID and stores all these factors (including ID, BBT, XS, s) into the 
database. After that, server continues to calculate O1, and O2 as 
follows: 
𝑂1 = ℎ(𝐵𝐵𝑇 ∥ 𝐼𝐷) 
𝑂2 = ℎ(𝐾𝑇 ∥ 𝑃𝑊𝑇) ⊕ ℎ(𝑋𝑠) 
Next, server sends to user a package including O1, O2, s, 
SPUB, p. Once receiving, user stores all these factors into his/her 
device. The enrollment phase is illustrated as Fig. 4 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Enrollment Phase 
B. Authentication Phase 
In this phase, user needs to provide his/her biometric feature 
B and retype the registered password PW. The Fuzzy Extractor 
module in his/her device generates the authentication key K 
from these inputs. In the next step, the newly generated key K 
combines with B to create the secure biometric version BB of 
the authentication phase. 
𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵 ⊕ 𝐾 
In the mean of time, user create a random number RC, then 
calculates the following messages: 
𝑀1 = 𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑠) 
𝑀2 = 𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑆𝑃𝑈𝐵) = 𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑇𝑋𝑠(𝑠)) 
𝛼 = ℎ(𝐾 ∥ 𝑃𝑊) ⊕ ℎ(𝑀1 ∥ 𝑀2 ∥ 𝑡1) 
After that, user sends to server the package including 
𝑂1, 𝑂2, 𝐵𝐵, 𝑀1, 𝛼, 𝑡1 in the fourth step. 
At server side, server has to perform some steps to verify its 
client. First of all, server checks timestamp 𝑡1. If the difference 
between 𝑡1 and current time is less than the predefined thresh-
old, server will do the next steps; if not, the process will be ter-
minated. Server calculates 𝑂′1 = ℎ(𝐵𝐵 ∥ 𝐼𝐷) from the received 
𝐵𝐵 and the 𝐼𝐷 stored in the database, then compares the result 
with the received 𝑂1. If matched, it also proves that this user has 
registered to the server and his/her biometric feature are 
matched. Server continues to do some calculations:  
𝑀′2 = 𝑇𝑋𝑠(𝑀1) = 𝑇𝑋𝑠(𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑠)) 
𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 = 𝑂2⨁ ℎ(𝑋𝑆) = ℎ(𝐾𝑇 ∥ 𝑃𝑊𝑇) ⊕ ℎ(𝑋𝑠)⨁ ℎ(𝑋𝑆)  
= ℎ(𝐾𝑇 ∥ 𝑃𝑊𝑇) 
The results are used to calculate 𝛼′. 
𝛼′ = 𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝 ⊕ ℎ(𝑀1 ∥ 𝑀
′
2 ∥ 𝑡1) 
                    = ℎ(𝐾𝑇 ∥ 𝑃𝑊𝑇) ⊕ ℎ(𝑀1 ∥ 𝑀
′
2 ∥ 𝑡1) 
Server performs the comparison between 𝛼 and 𝛼′ . If 
equal, it confirms that the password and the biometric data user 
provided are correct. And, 𝑀′2 is equal to 𝑀2, it helps to verify 
the SPUB without revealing RC to server or XS to user. 
In the next step, server randomly creates RS, and do some 
calculations: 
𝑀3 = 𝑇𝑅𝑠(𝑠) 
𝛽 = ℎ(𝑀′2 ∥ 𝑀3 ∥ 𝑡2) 
Then, server sends back to user the package including 
𝑀3, 𝛽, 𝑡2. This is the first stage of the authentication phase. The 
purpose of this stage is to authenticate user. The following steps 
belongs to the second stage. The purpose of this stage is to help 
user authenticate the server he/she communicates with. 
Once receiving the package in the eighth step, user check the 
timestamp 𝑡2. If the difference between 𝑡2 and current time is 
less than the predefined threshold, user will do the next steps; if 
not, the process will be terminated. In case 𝑡2 is validated, user 
calculates 𝛽′ = ℎ(𝑀2 ∥ 𝑀3 ∥ 𝑡2); then, compares 𝛽  and 𝛽′. If 
they are equal, it also means 𝑀2 and 𝑀′2 are equal, so user can 
be sure that the server he/she communicates with is the server 
he/she registered. After that, user needs to perform some calcu-
lations: 
𝑀4 = 𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑀3) = 𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑇𝑅𝑠(𝑠)) 
𝛾 = ℎ(𝑀2 ∥ 𝑀4 ∥ 𝑡3) 
User sends 𝛾, 𝑡3 to server through the tenth step. Once re-
ceiving, server checks timestamp 𝑡3  first. If 𝑡3  is validated, 
server will do the following calculations: 
𝑀′4 = 𝑇𝑅𝑠(𝑀1) = 𝑇𝑅𝑠(𝑇𝑅𝑐(𝑠)) 
𝛾′ = ℎ(𝑀′2 ∥ 𝑀′4 ∥ 𝑡3) 
Then, server compares 𝛾 and 𝛾′. The fact that they are equal 
proves that 𝑀4 and 𝑀′4 are equal. Server and user can use 𝑀4 
as a session key for later communication with each other by us-
ing a symmetric cryptosystem. And at last, the authentication is 
successful and server/client achieves a session key agreement. 
The authentication phase is illustrated as Fig. 5. 
 
 
  
 
Fig. 5. Authentication phase 
 
V. EVALUATION 
A. Security analysis 
Mutual authentication: Our protocol can achieve mutual au-
thentication between client and server. In the authentication 
phase, server has to verify 𝛼 and 𝛾 in order to ensure this user is 
the one he/she declares. Moreover, user also has to verify 𝛽 to 
authentication server. If attackers want to forge the messages, 
they have to face the typical problem DLP and DHP.  
Biometric template attack: the original biometric data of user 
is protected by the fuzzy extractor scheme. The process of gen-
erating biometric key is done in client side. The authentication 
factor server is known is the secure version of user’s biometric 
data 𝐵𝐵𝑇 . Therefore, the original biometric data cannot be com-
promised. 
Replay attack. The attacker can not reuse the old messages 
to deceive neither server nor client, because all these messages 
between client and server are added timestamps. Therefore, the 
attacke cannot pass the verification without the correct 
timestamp. 
Man-in-the-middle attack. In this attack, the attacker inter-
fere in the communication between client and server while they 
still believe that they are talking to each other over a private con-
nection. In this protocol, the mutual authentication requirement 
is satisfied, so it is very difficult for anyone to break into com-
munication between client and server. 
User anonymity: Somehow the attacker can eavesdrop on the 
conversation between client and server, then, try to track the 
user’s real identity to discover some sensity information of the 
user. In this protocol, the user’s identity ID is protected by 𝑂1 =
ℎ(𝐵𝐵𝑇 ∥ 𝐼𝐷). Therefore, our proposal can provide the user an-
onymity. 
B. Accuracy 
The training data contains a set of 50 face images, which are 
all in JPG format, 180 x 200 pixels. This set includes 22 images 
of 22 European and 28 images of 15 Asian.  
The registration data set contains 65 face images, including: 
54 images of 54 European and 11 images of 7 Asian. We divide 
the testing data set into 4 groups 
Group A includes 65 other images of the same 61 people in 
the registration set. The result from this group presents the fasle 
reject rate (FRR) 
Group B, C, D: each group includes 65 images of different 
people who did not register. The result from these groups present 
the false accept rate (FAR). 
TABLE II.  EXPERIMENTAL RESULT OF AUTHENTICATION PROCESS 
Group FAR FRR 
A X 5/65 
B 3/65 X 
C 3/65 X 
D 0/65 X 
 
The experimental results in Table II show that the average 
FAR is 3.07% and the average FRR is 7.96%. The fact that the 
error rates are quite low proves that the ability of face recogni-
tion of this proposal is acceptable. In the context of high level of 
security, this proposal absolutely can put into practice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have presented a noble biometric-based 
remote authentication protocol to most of sophisticated attacks 
over an open network. The proposed protocol combines user 
biometric with the other authentication factors to achieve the 
high level of security. The Chebyshev polynomials and fuzzy 
extractor scheme have been employed to ensure the protocol is 
resistant to biometric template attack, replay attack, man-in-the-
middle attack, user anonymity, and also achives the mutual au-
thentication and session key agreement at the end of the authen-
tication phase. The fact that the accuracy of this facial regconi-
tion system is quite good makes us believe that it can be put into 
practice in the near future. 
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